kryzysy marokańskie (11)

3-16

CHAPTER 1 1

THE SECOND MOROCCAN CRISIS, 1911

AngltfFnmcb Military Agraeinent, 20 Juty 1911 • Lloyd George at Ibc Mansion Mouse, 21 July 1911 • Dtary of C. P. Scott, Juty 1911-January 1912 (Extmcts) • Wilhelm II to Betbmann, 30 September 1911 • Bethmaun in Ibc Keicbstag, 10 Noucmbcr 1911 • Journal ofViscount Esbcr, 29 Moucmbcr 1911

In April 1911, the French governmenl responded to antiforeign rioling in Morocco by dis-patching troops. Th i s measurc caused Germany to charge that France excceded ils mandate under the Algeciras Act (Document 11.5). Subsequent negotiations bctween France and Germany to resolve the Moroccan problem once and for all quickly bogged down over the ques-tion of what Germany might consider adeqnate compensation for acquiescing to a French prolectorate in Morocco.

Tiying to furce the pace of the Franco-German talks, the German stale secretary, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, senl the German gunboat Panther to Agadir on the Southern Moroccan coast. The officia! explanation—that the Panlher's mission was to prolect German inierests against Moroccan antiforeignism—rang hollow in light of the fart that only a few Cermans resided in that par! of the sherillan kingdom. For their part, the Brilish Foreign Office and Ad-miralty were quick to suspect that Germany pursued a different ohjeclive altogether, namely the acquisition of a coaling station on Morocco's Atlantic coast. Whethcr or not Grcy and Churchill were correct in imputing this motive to Germany, there can be no question that they were piqued not only by the dispatch of the Panlher, but also by France's failure to keep the Foreign Office apprised of the details of the Franco-German negotiations. The irritalion felt in the Foreign Office adds to the tale a somewhat ironie twist, given the usual Foreign Office lament aboul Germany's pathological desire to insert itseif in questions where, in the consid-ered judgment of the Foreign Office, it had no interests.

Spcaking at the annual lord mayor's banquet at the Mansion Flouse, the British Chancel-lor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, signaled the displeasure of the British government at this State of affairs. The speech jolted the ongoing Franco-German negotiations—one histo-rian bas spoken of "epic mistiming"'¹—hut it left unclear which of the two countries, France or Germany, was its principal target. Nonetheless, ilu- German governmenl look umbrage, and Ihus what had been a bilateral Franco-German dispute over Morocco was transformed into an Ang/o-German crisis. A las!, and unforeseen, consequence of the speech was that it raised questions within the Britisii cabinet about the naturę of the British commitment to France; these, in tum, forced Grey to revcal to the entire cabinet that Staff talks bctween the Iwo countries had been conducted sińce 1906. Coincidentally, these talks—on the day before Lloyd George's speech—had yielded an agreement that "came elose to a military alliance and was far morę detailed than parallel Franco-Russian or German-Austrian arrangements."^1,1

Each of the principals in the Second Moroccan crisis came under attack at home. In Eng-land, the sagacity of Grey's leadership at the Foreign Oflicc was incrcasingly questioned by his colleagues in the cabinet; in Germany, the perception that the govemmenl had retreated under British pressure was grist for the miils of its right-wing critics and led Wilhelm II and Tir-pilz to contemplate further naval inereases; in France, the widespread belief that the Caillaux governmenl had given in to German bullying spurred a right-wing revival in the national elec-lions of January 1912.

a) Anglo-French Military Agreement, 20 July J91lM&$^'

■.. Important modifications were applied in 1911 to the carly plan^ thelEn^Iish-goy-crnment wisliing to givc morę breadth to its futurę military cooperationycrcythe eon-tinent and to make it morę effective in expediting the airi^o^ihe^^stómy-toj the theater of operations.... [After] the conference

1911 at the Ministry ofWar in Parts bctween General Dubail^ChiefofStaffioh^e^rmy¹; and General Wilson, Director of Military Operations in the War, Offiće^^^iTiCmoran-i! dum summarizing the bases of the military entente was signcdbyithesefĘtirohigh military authorities. '

It is, moreover, stipulated in this document that the talks undcrtakeri;are"devoid of any official charaeter and ctmnot tie on any issue the Engli.slr and French goccrn-menis.” • /• ■ ' >

The generał dispo.sitions provided by the conference of 20 July'l9rTwh.Tv-e beciv_trendered precisc and completed by the frcquent eommunicaiiontthatrclre French chief of.staff lias had with the War Ofhcc through our military attache, J..,

1.. . . The English expeditionary army[’355 sj ... lotni numbers; will bc .-,np*”. proximatcly: 6,900 officcrs; 165,000 men; 69,500 horses; 492 . cannoni^^fj;£_v . i 2. . . . The landing of combatants will begin on the fourth dayandwnircnd on the; thirtccnth day of English mobilization. ...

—DOF. .M-Sefies, 2\2 72;

• vj ••. ~

& ;

b) Lloyd George at the Mansion Honse, 21 July 1911' . ':

... And there is only one circumstance that could possibly interfere■atJtlTis^nroment* with the continued flow of that stream of prosperit}' whose\feftili;iiiij^^ti«iec.isi spreading over the whole worki, and that circumstance would 'be’;anfthihgŚAvhich] woukl disturh international pcace.Peace is the first condition ofconrintrętTpimspćriit^ Fbrtunately there is no reason to fear that such a ctGustrupbc.is.:imtnh^l^llhpugli; there are of course constant ąuestions which arise between,Govrrnxnent%which$ro^ duce discussion and sometimes irritation... .Britain should atallJraiCTrd^^nr.iin her place and her prestigc amongst the Great Powers of fluence has many a timc been in the past, and may the causc of human liberty. It has morę than oncc in the^:pastTĆdeeme$^^ tions, who tire sometimes too apt to forget that seryicc;froip^qvei^hć{n^g^ii^tcrś and evcn front nationa! extinction. I would make great sacrihceS;'toj:preserye;^:pence, I; concciee that nothing would justify a disturbancc of _;internationiil|goącl|jyfll,exccpt} ąuestions of the gr.ivest national moment. But if a situation were tcrbęfor^ upon us.j in which pcacc could only bc preser\’ed by the surrender ofttheigrot^Tięlśbeneficent ' position Britain has won by ccnturies of heroism and achievcmcttt;;bwmpwing Britairf to be treated where her interests were vitaiły affcctcd ;ts if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would bc a hu-miliation intolcrable for a great country likc ours to endure [chcers)..■

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