82142 kryzysy marokańskie (13)

34SJ:g . CHAPTER 11

c) 0^:Diary of C P. Scott,”Juty 1911-January 1912 (Extrcicts)

22 Jaj}': Brcakfast with Lloyd Georgc. ... On thc whole he was strongly in fhvor of pro-, cecćling in the most conciliatory manner possible but of insisting unflinchingly that no chanie iri diestatus quo in Morocco should takc place without our being madę parties to i'|^quitH^*, was quite conscious of thc anti-Gcrmanism of thc Foreign Office Staff . andjwis p repu re d tó rcsist it. But neither lic nor Grey nor himsclf (Lloyd Gcorgc) would • cońscntTohold Office unless thcy were permitted to assert thc claim of Grcat Hritain to havc,lieTtreaty rights and hcr rcal intcrcsts considcrcd and to be trcated with ordinary diplorifatic civility as a Ci mu Power. The whole correspondence would havc hcrcafter to befrublished and it would bc fatal even to our ILibcral] party intcrcsts if it should bc fountlititfit we had not maintained thc elear rights and thc digmcy of thc country.

ftof course agreecl with him [Lloyd George] about this. I did not think it conceiv-abl^rat-Germahy should rcsist such a dcmand temperatcly pressed, but thc question wasjwhtrt interests had we for which in thc last resort we were prepared to go to war nndSyjas thc prevention of a German nava! base at Agadir one of them. I got no elear answer tó this.... The impression I got was tliat he is not immunc from thc microbe of Germanophobia____

§Śńufchili’.s'only contributions to thc discussion ... were his highly rhctorical dc-nunclations repeated at intervals of the insolenee of Germany and thc need of assert-ing?!^-sclvcs and tcaching bera Icsson.Every question with him becomcs a pcrsonal qucśtion.;....

mm •■ -.tlrey also toki me that the [German] negotiation with France was liei^^ćónductecl under the pledge of sccrecy—i.e. that France was not at liberty to irifcfmi tis of its prógress. A new point to mc and a nither gnive one was thc generał cot^entióhl.jiwhićh i understood from Grey to bc put forward by GcrmanyU that by t$rr agreemeht giving France a free hand politically in Morocco we had estopped ourseive.s from, interfering in any dlrect political negotiations into which she might enter .with another power, just as France would be estopped from interfering under śimilar circumstanccs in ligypt. lt was this 1 gathered which madę him so anxious that it slrotrld bc at oncc and cicarly understood in Germany tliat we should regard thc presence of a great naval power like Germany on thc Atlantic coast of Morocco as constituting a ncw situation and giving us a right which we meant to assert to be eon-sidercdAtńd cónśultcd. Hc did not wish Germany througli ignonince of our rcal inten-tioir^t^<^irnit"heRtcif.!iO far that she could not withdraw, as happened with Russia before-the Crimean War.^v'

7 November: [In the vicw of Sir Frank Lascelles,] the Germans are an extrcmely scnsitiye pcople. As Lord Salisbury put it to [him],“Thcy are like a jealous woman.” "But /tcilrthem' he added[,] “we are not monogamists; wc.are polygamists. Sir>I^fSiwętłeś’5bwi opinion about Agadir is that it was a mis takc—“cver sińce IBeth^nn^"] canic into Office,"he said,“hc has in my opinion madc a scrics of mis-tak'«':i3ad;he;4ia.sShown his clevcrness chichy in getting out of their consequonees“—

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but its importance was greatly exaggerated. It was just a move in thc garnce and not greatly have alarmed us.. .. Speaking generally he deprecated Ettglish ner ness in regard to Germany as uncalled for and undignified. The gross error in r to German naval construction for which McKenna^56b was responsible Iast.yearjs 1909] and which had never been confessed as it ought to have been was pro due to this cause. A morę recent example was the scare (of which hehappen have information though a friend in the navy) that we were on thc point, (a n ago) of being attacked by Germany which had no better foundation than that/th mir.ilty had Iost sight of two German gunboats....

7 January 1912: [Conversation with Loreburn'']- Germany for years has been t to make friends.“Incredib!e''the way she has been repulsed. For 3 years have been ] ing for information. Questions constantly evaded sometimes witli actual falsehoods —Trevor Wilson (ed.), The Political Diarias of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928 (Ithaea, 1970),

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ci)    Wilhelm II to Bethmann, 30 September 1911

... A nava! amendment is to be introduced [in thc Reichstag] later in the f: 1912.'^K We are undeniably at an important turning point in thc history of our fa land. We have recognized the adversary, were ncarly humiliated by him,.and h: endure this gritting our tecth. Our friendship does not interest him. That is bec we are not yet strong enough. He is impressed onJy when confronted by powet strength, when hc faces incontrovertible facts.Our people expect a government can act, not jiist negotiatc. There must be a national purpose [72r/], which direct: entluisiasm of Gcrmans along the right path without giving the opponem catr: act. That is the path sketched by me, i.e.giving notice [that we aim for] a 2:3 rat the German to the British flcet. . . .

—Alfred von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumentc (Stuttgart, 19241, 1:21

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e)    Bethmann in the Reichstag, 10 Noeember 1911

... Herr Uasscrmann"-' said tliat instead of sending a ship to Agadir, we Should i taken measures on our western border. Wcll,gentlemcn,what kind of measures? n movements perhaps? Gentlemen, troop movements on our western border in midst of a crisis are the beginning of a mobilization [correct! left and center], a mobilization in a crisis means war [correct! left]. I doubt whether suCh a mea would havc been seen in France as an invitation to sit down with us and to bargaining [laughter—correct!].... Herr von Heydebrand⁶⁰ ... said that we hcard, in a speech based on consultations with the entire British cabinet, langi both humiiiating and constituting a warlike challenge to the German people which I supposedly dismissed with slight-of-hand as an “after-dinner speech,”... ( tlemcn, I regret that our relations with a State with which we have normal relarion:

^5l,,Regindlcl McKenna (1863-1943). First Lord of the Admiralty, 1908-1911.

” Robert, Baron Loreburn (1846-1923). Lord chancellor, 1906-1916.

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