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��POLITICAL THEORY / Durst / REVIEW ESSAYOctober 2000 REVIEW ESSAYS THE PLACE OF THE POLITICAL IN DERRIDA AND FOUCAULT DERRIDA & THE POLITICAL by Richard Beardsworth. London: Routledge, 1996. 174 + xvii pp. FOUCAULT & THE POLITICAL by Jon Simons. London: Routledge, 1995. 152 + viii pp. In the programmatic preface to Routledge s series Thinking the Political, general editors Kieth Ansell-Pearson and Simon Critchley state that in pre- senting the work of major contemporary Continental thinkers, its aim is to show how it is only in the relation between the philosophical and the political that new possibilities of thought and politics can be activated. It is in this spirit that Richard Beardsworth s Derrida & the Political and Jon Simons s Foucault & the Political appear as volumes of this series. At the outset of his study, Beardsworth asserts that the political dimen- sions of Derrida s deconstruction have been underestimated in the past. The reception of Derrida s thought in the 1970s in Anglo-Saxon literature departments overplayed its rhetorical side, reducing deconstruction to a practice of literary criticism, the political orientation of which was easily advertised, but poorly elaborated (p. 3). The Heidegger and de Man affairs in the 1980s drew out Derrida s critics, and his reputation suffered by associ- ation. Upstaged then by historicism and multiculturalism, deconstruction came to be perceived as incapable of articulating historical making and unmaking of subjectivities. Derrida s more recent writings on politics have mitigated this view only in part. A major objective of Beardsworth s book is thus to re-open a discussion of the political reach of deconstruction in order to redress these misunderstandings. Counter to once prevailing opinion, Beardsworth maintains that Derrida s political engagement inheres in the very method of deconstruction and the political dimension of Derrida s thinking can be gauged only in respect of this method (p. 1). Not only is deconstruction politically informed; according to Beardsworth, it can even POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 28 No. 5, October 2000 675-689 � 2000 Sage Publications, Inc. 675 676 POLITICAL THEORY / October 2000 assist us in surmounting the present paralysis of political thought and prac- tice (p. xii). Beardsworth posits a set of principles that structures his complex and insightful reconstruction of the political implications of deconstruction. A political reading of Derrida s philosophy will show first that, at its most basic level, deconstruction is a genealogy of violence, which is simultaneously a genealogy of the originary technicity of law (p. 13). And to the extent that all institutions are established by law, deconstruction can be characterized as a radical critique of institutions (p. 19). That institutions are of a violently technical nature implies furthermore the aporetic character of all rational judgement; the law of law, its ineluctable economy of violence, holds out no false hope for the reconciliation of metaphysical opposites, such as culture and nature, in a non-coercive identity of rational judgement beyond the con- straints of violence. Beardsworth can thus assert that Derrida s aporetic thinking is the very locus in which the political force of deconstruction is to be found (p. xiv). Standing in the Western tradition of ideology critique, deconstruction sec- ondly reveals how the disavowal of originary violence by Western metaphys- ics leads to greater violence in politics. Deconstruction tracks down traces of repression in societal institutions by uncovering the hidden originary technicity of writing in speech and so forth. Where social, economic, and political institutions make claims to reconciliation, for instance, in the unity of the nation, the solidarity of workers, the trust (Fukuyama) of economic cooperation in late capitalism, or the ideal of communication free of domi- nation (Habermas) in today s liberal democratic states, deconstruction seeks to disclose the disavowed violence hidden in these institutional arrange- ments. By positing the possibility for a reconciled unity of opposites in the present, Western rationality denies the ineluctable violence of law and, thereby, also disavows the promise of the future. Whether it be in Saussure s natu- ral unity of signifier and signified or in Hegel s Volksgeist, metaphysical logic reduces the passage of time to presence. What is meant by the dis- avowal of the future by the metaphysics of presence can be highlighted in a symptomatic statement of Hegel s. In his Heidelberg Lectures on Natural Right, Hegel asserts, in the state the universal will becomes actual; the uni- versal has determinate existence as absolute end. Here there is no longing, nothing beyond our ken, no future; the purpose is actual and present. 1 Beardsworth can thus state that not just the disavowal of technicity but also the disavowal of time in reflection upon the political has led to much injus- tice and violence, such as in Communist, Fascist and Nazi variants of to- talitarianism (pp. xiii, xvi). What adds a specific timbre to Beardsworth s book is its attempt to make Derrida s analysis of time fruitful for political the- Durst / REVIEW ESSAY 677 ory. For if time is violence, as Derrida states, then it is political. Or, as Beardsworth comments, Derrida s philosophy is necessarily political because it is a thinking of time (p. 150); that is, a critique of the disavowal of time and its consequences for a politics of greater violence. Yet, like so many of his double moves, Derrida also maintains distance from traditional ideology critique by rejecting the possibility of sublating (Aufhebung) the violence of law in reconciled social relationships; perceiv- ing the ultimate danger of politics in the disavowal of the violence, technicity, and time of law, that is, in the fiction[s] of a substantial community or phantasms of nonviolent reconciliation in the present, Derrida asserts the aporetic character of socially constructed identity. Deconstruction therefore seeks at once both to overturn metaphysical oppositions and open them onto an undecidable position without reconciliation. Yet, rather than see in this politics without passage a regress to the inevitability of violence, Beards- worth insists that Derrida s aporetic politics reflects a radicalization of dem- ocratic thinking, which recognizes the now of an absolute future, a non- eschatological, . . . ever-recurrent promise of the non-adequation of the present to itself (pp. 42, 101). For Beardsworth, then, Derrida s aporetic thinking not only describes an essential limit to political logic ; it also situates in this present irreducibly open to the future the possibility of democracy. Rather than the greater vio- lence of disavowed technicity and truncated time in the phantasms of recon- ciliation, Derrida s aporetic politics commits itself to the promise of the future and the justice of lesser violence in an economy of violence (p. 12). This impossible politics of deconstruction acknowledges the economy of violence, aporia, time, and future in the unsurpassable move- ment of diff�rance between universal law and the singular. In sum, Beards- worth effectively portrays deconstruction as a critique of the philosophical roots of twentieth-century totalitarianisms and a politico-ethical logic of lesser violence; as such, his sustained discussion of deconstruction s geneal- ogy of violence represents a timely and significant contribution to our under- standing of Derrida s thought and its political yield. Beardsworth s monograph is broken down into three major chapters, which respectively pursue Derrida s aporetics of language in Saussure s lin- guistics and Kafka s literature, the political limits of law in Kant s moral and legal formalism and Hegel s ethical life, and the aporia of time as the aporia of law in Heidegger s thought of being and Levinas s ethics. In the first major chapter, Beardsworth sets out to show how Derrida s thought may be articulated as a genealogy of violence. After reconstructing in clear and broad strokes the deconstruction of Saussurean linguistics, Beardsworth focuses on what Derrida calls the tertiary structure of vio- 678 POLITICAL THEORY / October 2000 lence. In Of Grammatology, Derrida names three levels of violence, which Beardsworth argues can be formalized in the following way: First, the originary violence of the system of differences. . . ; second, the violence of what is commonly conceived as the attempt to put an end to violence the institution of law but which is revealed as a violence because of the apparent suppression of originary dif- ference; and third, the necessary (if empirical) possibility of phenomenal violence as the consequence of the inability of the law to suppress its illegality in relation to originary difference. (P. 23) As a critique of institutions, deconstruction seeks to uncover the unrecog- nized tertiary structure of violence necessarily involved in an institution s foundation, its exclusions, and its subsequent contradictions. It is this tertiary structure of violence that will inform Beardsworth s reconstruc- tion of the Derridian deconstructive reading of the practical philosophy of Kant and Hegel. If the first major chapter reveals the general framework of Derrida s gene- alogy of violence as applied to language and literature, Beardsworth s sec- ond chapter relates these insights to modern political thought by posi- tion[ing] Derrida s work with regard to its major axis the difference between the thought of Kant and that of Hegel (p. 47). The choice of Kant and Hegel is not accidental; Beardsworth s interest is to show how decons- truction can move the contemporary debate between (Kantian) liberals and (Hegelian) communitarians forward. Yet, in attempting to open up a space for Derrida s political thinking between Kant s liberal theory of right and Hegel s philosophy of ethical life, Beardsworth tends to cloud their respec- tive positions. In uncovering how Kant and Hegel disavow violence, Beardsworth underrepresents Kant s recognition of the coercive character of right as well as the conflicting difference of civil society and overidentifies Hegel with his totalitarian fate in communism and fascism or overcharacterizes the fate of Hegel s thought as totalitarian and terroristic (pp. 84, 47). As a consequence, it remains unclear whether and how the method of deconstruction can make a concrete contribution to the debate between liberals and communitarians. Beardsworth is intent to reveal how for Derridean deconstruction Kantian thought represents a classic gesture of liberal rationality which disavows its own force under the cover of naturality. . . . This disavowal cannot fail . . . toplace violence outside the law. The violence in maintaining the limit as natural is revealed as/in the contradictions of Kant s thought. (P. 62) Durst / REVIEW ESSAY 679 In application of Derrida s tertiary structure of violence, Beardsworth argues that Kant s practical philosophy involves three levels of disavowed violence: (1) the disavowal of violence in the a priori foundation of universal law according to the principle of contradiction, (2) the unrecognized violence of the suppressed difference in ethics and civil society, and (3) the violence involved in suppressing the return of repressed difference in Kant s rejection of the right to revolt. Beardsworth s opening argument is as straightforward as it is insightful. Kant grounds morality and justice in the universality of law, the coherency of which rests in its conformity to the law of contradiction. From Derrida s dis- cussion of Kant in his article on Kafka s tale Before the Law, Beardsworth learned that the principle of contradiction represents an evacuation, from the domain of philosophy, of the problem of time. For, in formal logic, A cannot be A at one and the same time. Formal logic thus denies time to constitute itself as such: it is. . . thedisavowal of time (p. 54). The principle of contra- diction, which is the precondition not only for scientific thought but also the violence of techno-sciences, reappears in ethical and political institutions. Its effects are deleterious. By displacing the logic of non-contradiction from the field of knowledge to the ethical and political fields, Beardsworth con- tends, Kant is unable to think the contradiction through between law and time. . . . The inability engenders in Kant s ethical and political writings a dis- avowal of the inextricable, but necessary relation between rights and vio- lence (p. 54). In Kantian ethics, for example, only those maxims are morally justifiable that are noncontradictory; it is the universal and necessary form of the law that determines moral integrity, not historical or empirical content. Kant s practical reason thus stands outside of time and space ; it is de- historized. Moreover, by reducing morality to the conformity of a maxim with noncontradictory universal law, Kant banishes the risk of ethical judge- ment, thereby abolishing judgement, which is the very condition of ethi- cal orientation (p. 64). The disavowal of violence is documented not only in the denial of the originary difference in noncontradictory universal law. In Kant s political theory, the initial disavowal leads to violence at a secondary level in civil society s differential relations. Modern liberal politics � la Kant expels vio- lence as a non-civil phenomenon from the social whole, for it fails to recog- nize that struggle is inherent to human organization (p. 76). In consequence, a third level of violence appears, in which according to Beardsworth Kant argues that the right to resistance is not a right, because it is self- contradictory and, therefore, immoral (p. 69). Disavowing the violent il- 680 POLITICAL THEORY / October 2000 legality of universal law, Kant expels rebellion against this violence to a sphere outside the law. Yet, while Beardsworth is correct in highlighting how by applying the principle of contradiction to morality and legality Kant disavows the originary violence and time in the a priori grounding of universal law, Kant does not deny the constraining effects of universal law altogether. On the con- trary, Kant seeks to legitimate self-coercion in morality and external coer- cion in politics by linking the practice of constraint to the principle of uni- versality. In the Metaphysics of Morals, for instance, Kant identifies the universal principle of right with the reciprocal constraint of individuals in the state.2 Although Beardsworth admits that Kant s Idea of the Highest Good mends the division between moral subjectivity and material objec- tivity though constraint (p. 71), what remains outstanding is a clarification of the difference between the violence left unrecognized by Kant and his discourse on moral and legal coercion. This is especially troubling, for Beardsworth identifies the constraint of abstract law with violence: the con- cept of (non-contradictory) identity is one that violently subsum[es] the singular. This would be a philosophy of constraint (p. 75). This difficulty repeats itself on at least two occasions. Beardsworth argues that by disavowing violence in noncontradictory universal law, Kant is forced to adopt a conception of political equality that misrecognizes both its discrepancy with economic inequality and the necessary conflict arising from this inequality as well as from the differentiation of organized human activity (p. 76). Yet, Kant neither simply ignores the relationship between formal political equality and economic inequality, nor does he simply fail to recognize that struggle is inherent to human organization (p. 76). In Theory and Practice, Kant states that the uniform equality of human beings as sub- jects of a state is . . . perfectly consistent with the utmost inequality of the masses in the degree of its possessions. 3 For Kant, this differential relation has system, for formal equality is the precondition for sociocultural differ- ence in civil society. Thus, although Beardsworth may be correct that in Kantian ethics the noncontradictory moral will can have no truck with the heteronomy of conflicting desires, thereby exacting a repression of contra- diction, in politics the case seems more complex. Without a doubt, Kant demands the suppression of illegal behavior. But within the constricting lim- its of abstract right, Kant also postulates the necessity of envy, competition and difference as the fertile soil for the actualization of creative human poten- tial, individual freedom, and the advance of human civilization; without dis- cord, Kant writes in Idea for a Universal History, all human talents would remain hidden forever in a dormant state. 4 Hence, the other side of the Durst / REVIEW ESSAY 681 law-governed state s violent exclusion of illegal action is for Kant not the ide- ology of an harmonious civil society, as Beardsworth implies, but recognition of the coercive character of prohibitive law and the continuing antago- nisms of civil life. Lastly, although Beardsworth is correct to assert that Kant rejects the right to revolt, he does not state that all resistance is immoral. Kant supports the violent suppression of political revolt by rejecting the legal right to rebel- lion. But, as Hans Reiss explains, while Kant maintained that it is our legal duty to observe state law, he also argued that no one should be compelled to comply with laws which require him to commit immoral acts. . . . Indeed, it is our moral duty not to abide by such commands. 5 Hence, Kant s quotation of St. Paul s injunction in Romans I, XIII, 21-22 in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone that we should obey the powers that be because they are ordained of God is overridden by the command, expressly quoted by Kant, in Acts V, 29, that we must obey God rather than man. 6 Beardsworth turns next to the relationship between Derrida and Hegel. The objective here is to show how for Derrida, Hegel s dialectical sublation of the coercive economies of Kant s moral and legal formalism into ethical life (Sittlichkeit) leads to a re-cognition or re-stricture of repression. What is meant here? In Dissemination, Derrida writes that the aporia of diff�rance marks the critical limits of the idealizing powers of relief (la rel�ve, Aufhebung) (p. 6, footnote). Where Hegel posits the possibility for the Aufhebung of contradiction into a post-aporetic, non-violent, differen- tial unity of the Volk, Derrida rejects the offer as a ruse. Instead, deconstruc- tion reveals how the logic of ethical life is not dialectical but aporetic, not a logic of redemption but a logic of repression. In Glas, Beardsworth explains, one of the major concerns of Derrida s text lies in . . . showing, from within dialectic, that Hegel s differential identities are phantasms, uni- ties of phantasmic repression (p. 77). Paradoxically, Hegel s critique of the Kantian moral and legal constraint not only resists, but also sustains, the modern violence of revolutionary politics (p. 70). The first-level suppression of diff�rance in Hegel s dialectical logic leads to a return of the repressed and its subsequent suppression at secondary sites. According to Beardsworth, an example of this secondary region of violence is found in Hegel s treatment of the P�bel (rabble). Hegel claims to sublate the violence of civil society in the ethical state. Yet in truth, Beardsworth argues, dialectical logic forces Hegel not to see this stateless pocket within the state as an essential contingency of all states. The aporetic impossibility of rationalizing the empirical infinity of need is hidden through the mis- 682 POLITICAL THEORY / October 2000 recognition of the state-less as a rabble (p. 93). This exclusionary practice gives rise to a third level of violence, which involves the externalization of this internal conflict in colonialism and war. Hegel s statements show that international relations are not rational but predicated upon the fundamental irrationality of the economy, which leads to the infinity of injustice, terri- torial expansion and conquest of colonialism. . . . Hisdesire to think of the Volk as unified, to think of history as logical (the law of international contradiction, the Weltgeist), and to think of violence as occurring at the limits of a state s own lands leads to the misrecognition of violence. (P. 94) Yet, while Hegel attempts to sublate formal subjectivity into concrete ethi- cal universality, he does not abandon the infinite right of subjectivity. Hegel sought to augment, to reinforce the power of abstract right by the hege- monic force of ethical life, not to do away with it. This is the crucial differ- ence separating Hegel from his terroristic or totalitarian fates in com- munism and fascism, movements with little, if any, respect for formal individual rights. Beardsworth seems to overlook this when he writes, for example, that in the very attempt to restrict rights to their field, in order to give form to the multiplicity of life, Hegel restricts them totally (p. 77). Let us not miss the double meaning or undecidability of the re-stricture of repression Derrida ascribes to ethical life. In Glas, Derrida attempts to reveal how the Aufhebung of abstract right into ethical life at once both restricts (i.e., confines) the coercion of abstract law by transcending the repressive limit between universal law and individual desire in ethical customs and restricts (i.e., tightens) the repressive force of law through the disavowal of violence, technicity, and time in the phantasms of ethical reconciliation. But here the notion of a total restriction of coercive law in the ethical community is mis- leading. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel acknowledged that ethical norms cannot totally sublate the conflict of civil society. While Hegel argued, for instance, that the rabble mentality resulting from poverty could be thwarted by disciplinary institutions, such as the police, he did not deny the ineluctability of economic impoverishment, as Beardsworth s arguments imply. And due to these ineluctable contingencies, Hegel was convinced that the threat of violent sanction by the law-governed state remained necessary. In sum, by overextending Derrida s tertiary structure of violence in its application to Kant s liberal thought and Hegel s philosophy of ethical life, Beardsworth seems to convince us less of limitations inherent in the political thought of Kant and Hegel than those given in the method of deconstruction itself. Durst / REVIEW ESSAY 683 In the final major chapter, Beardsworth takes up Derrida s negotiations with Levinas s ethics and Heidegger s thought of being to highlight how Derrida s thinking of the aporia of law is the aporia of time (p. 99). Beards- worth situates Derrida between Heidegger and Levinas by claiming that whilst indebted to both their genealogies of the metaphysical tradition (one in terms of time Heidegger, the other in terms of law Levinas), Derrida s thinking can be identi- fied with neither, because his deconstruction of metaphysics is made in terms of time and law. (P. 98) The ineluctable violence of law is simultaneously the self-deferment of time to itself, that is, diff�rance. Yet, in Heidegger s opposition between authentic and inauthentic conceptions of time and in Levinas s theory of alterity, the violence of time and law is respectively disavowed. Whereas Heidegger dis- avows the violence of time in the authentic temporality of the Volk (as opposed to the inauthentic temporality of das Man) and Levinas disavows the violence of law in the ethical relation to the Other, Beardsworth argues that Derrida retains the aporetic dimension by insisting on the violence of time and law: the experience of aporia is one of time and law. The passage of time and the violence of law form two sides of the same coin (p. 101). Symptom- atic of this disavowal of violence in Heidegger s politics of authentic tem- porality and Levinas s politics of ethical singularity is their subsequent support for the political use of violence. Whether it be Levinas s ethical jus- tification of the politics of Israel or Heidegger s metaphysical grounding of the movement, according to Beardsworth, both authors reproduce the same logic by forgetting the promise of the future (p. 144). I close my discussion of Derrida & the Political with a question that touches on Beardsworth s concluding remarks on the relationship between originary technicity, time, and the promise of a politics of lesser violence. Throughout his complex and informative text, Beardsworth argues that it is above all the disavowal of originary violence or originary technicity of law that leads to greater violence. In his reconstruction of Derrida s negotia- tions with Saussure, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Levinas, Beardsworth shows how each of these philosophers fails to account adequately for the irre- ducible technicity of law and time; in consequence, a politics of greater vio- lence seems inevitable. Yet, there is at least one text Beardsworth takes up that may run counter to this reading Heidegger s An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935). In this text, written while a politically committed, if crit- ical, supporter of the Nazi movement, Heidegger accounts for the originary violence and technicity of history. Yet, Beardsworth sees it differently. In the 684 POLITICAL THEORY / October 2000 conclusion, he states that it is the denial of originary technicity and, there- with, originary violence that informs Heidegger s engagements with Nazism (p. 152). Admitting to the combative character of this assertion s premise, in a footnote Beardsworth discourages the informed reader from interpreting this statement as his misunderstanding of the role of technics in Heidegger s thinking of the history of being (p. 163, n.3). Beardsworth justifies his position by clarifying that throughout his work Heidegger main- tained an axiomatic distinction between phusis and techne. Yet, in An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger states that it would require a special 7 study to explain what is essentially the same in phusis and techne ; hence, he seems to reject an axiomatic distinction between the two by tracing their dif- ference to the specific history of being. More important, however, is the fact that in his discussion of deinon or man as the unheimlich or violent one, Heidegger sets techne not simply in opposition to phusis but to dike: the 8 reciprocal confrontation [of dike and techne] is ; here, being (or phusis) is the opposing strife between overwhelming dike and violent techne. In other words, Heidegger avoids here any flat opposition between the authentic and the inauthentic that Beardsworth detects with Derrida, for instance, in Being and Time. And far from disavow violence, Heidegger here exalts the originary violence of the unheimlich ones, such as those, like the poet, who create the institutions of the polis. Indeed, it is precisely this glorification of originary creative violence that seems to represent the height of Heidegger s Verstrickung in Nazism. As Richard Wolin writes, in Heidegger s Introduc- tion to Metaphysics violence takes on the character of an ontological imper- 9 ative. Hence, not so much the spiritualization of national socialism, as Derrida sees it, or a disavowal of originary technicity but Heidegger s tempo- rary suspension of his ethic of letting beings be (which Derrida associ- ates with being as close as possible to nonviolence ) and subsequent glorifi- cation of the law-creating violence (Wolin) of the unheimlich ones in the establishment of new institutions of the German Volk would be the path to reconstruct Heidegger s negotiations with national socialism. But what then, we are left to ask, if anything, distinguishes Derrida here from Heidegger, both of whom have plumbed the depths of the violence of Western metaphysics? Despite proximity, the difference between Derrida and Heidegger here is as vast and irreducible as it is tenuous it is the aporetic decision to commit oneself to the lesser violence within a general economy of violence, a contingent choice of ethico-political import that, it seems, no philosophical avowal or disavowal of originary violence can necessarily secure. Bereft of any sure footing, the practical use of theory opens onto the undecidablity of diff�rance, onto Derrida s aporetic decision to adopt a poli- Durst / REVIEW ESSAY 685 tics of lesser violence, the complex structure of which we are indebted to Beardsworth for illuminating so well. In contrast to Derrida, throughout most of his career Michel Foucault was recognized as a politically engaged thinker, even if his political commitments have remained for some obscure. Yet, despite their profound differences, the ethico-political projects of Derrida and Foucault converge in many ways on what we could term a common sensibility for the irreducible violence of dis- course and the need for an open, aporetic, and agonal democracy. It is the merit of Jon Simons s book Foucault & the Political not only to reconstruct in general terms Foucault s oppositional critique of modern (political) rational- ity but also to throw further needed light on his affirmative theorization of new modes of subjectivity. In the introduction, Simons outlines the interpretive frame of his study. Foucault s critique of the present tends to oscillate between what Simons awkwardly terms the unbearable lightness and heaviness of its seemingly contradictory commitments. Foucault is said to swing in mood between two poles, namely, that our present is one of either total constraint or untrammeled freedom. It is to Simons s credit that he attempts to steer a middle course between these two extremes, highlighting how on the whole, but not always, Foucault resists the magnetism of the two poles, riding the tension by adopting unstable positions between them (p. 3). The novel focus of Simons s book is its concentration on the question of limits in Foucault s political thought. Simons breaks his study down into two major sections. After an initial discussion of Foucault s methodology, Simons turns to Foucault s critique of humanism s constricting and enabling limits that both threaten individual autonomy. He then takes up an analysis of the ethical turn given in Foucault s later writings, which posits the possibility of individual practices of freedom that transgress the constraining and subjugating limits of the modern humanist regime (p. 31). In his discussion of methodology, Simons stresses Foucault s indebted- ness to Kant and Nietzsche. In his late essay on What is Enlightenment?, Foucault attempts to situate himself in the tradition of the European Enlight- enment. Foucault agrees with Kant that the Enlightenment is an age of cri- tique in which humanity employs its own reason and questions the illegiti- mate uses of reason by authority. Yet, while Kant believes the function of critique to be setting proper limits for reason s legitimate use, Foucault rede- fines critique as a political problem. Foucault s critical philosophy is one of limits, but as Simons stresses these limits are not just of reason but also of power. Hence, as Foucault states, The point . . . is totransform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that 686 POLITICAL THEORY / October 2000 takes the form of a possible transgression (p. 17). Furthermore, in Foucault s version the limits to be transgressed are historical and contingent, not necessary and universal. Critique should thus involve a historical dimen- sion that Foucault in tribute to Nietzsche terms genealogy. As a critical history of the present, genealogy reveals how the political question par excel- lence is truth; that is, how the will to truth is a will to power. The fundamental assumption of Foucault s genealogy is that we must conceive discourse as a violence we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them (p. 20). In his discussion of Foucault s critique of modern (political) rationality, Simons is guided by the thesis that for Foucault humanist theory promotes modes of subjectification that are simultaneously modes of subjection (p. 68). In other words, Foucault seeks to uncover how institutions of modern societ- ies render individuals to subjects who are at once both socially productive and subjected. In an interview conducted a year before his death, Foucault retrospectively perceives three axes of subjectification: truth, power, and eth- ics. Simons reconstructs Foucault s successive attempts to determine the lim- its of the humanist regime : (1) in his work in the 1960s on the archaeology of modern epistemes, which reveals how man is placed in the ambiguous position of being both an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator (p. 24); (2) in his genealogy of appa- ratuses of power beginning in the 1970s, which uncovers how relations of power and scientific discourses mutually constitute one another (p. 25); and (3) in his writings beginning in the mid-1970s on modern disciplinary institu- tions, such as prisons, schools, and factories, which disclose how power func- tions not just to repress but also positively to enable and constitute sub- jects that are at the same time subjected (pp. 30-31). Simons highlights how in the late 1970s Foucault augmented his micro- physics of disciplinary power with a macro-physical analysis of govern- mentality. Here, Foucault shows how the art of modern government becomes demonic by combining the individualizing effects of pastoral power to the reason of the state in the early modern period. Reason of state, Simons explains, relies on the technology of police to make individuals useful. The aim of the police is salvation in this world, in the form of health, well- being. . . security, protection against accidents (p. 39). This instrumentalization of human happiness for state strength represents for Foucault a central moment in the solidification of the humanist regime. Simons s book is particularly instructive in this context by showing how Foucault explains the subsequent shift from police to liberalism in the modern period. Once society has been constructed as a self-regulative machine by the disciplinary measures of the police, these disciplines appear to be a cumbersome form of power. In other Durst / REVIEW ESSAY 687 words, once subjects have been individualized and social cohesion imposed in keeping with the imperatives of the political economy, liberalism may be articulated as the belief that there is always too much government (p. 56). Yet, rather than leading to the creation of a space of limitless freedom in civil society, Simons carefully points out that for Foucault, liberalism transforms the programme of policing into a set of practices for the constitution of sub- jects according to the model of individuality as an enterprise or entrepreneur of the self, subject to the demands of the political economy (p. 59). Hence, Foucault s genealogy reveals how liberalism s stress on individuality reflects its commitment to the individualization pole of the paradox of humanism. Yet liberal political philosophy obscures the price paid on the totalization side of the account (p. 59). If the constant correlation of individualization and totalization reflects the ultimate danger of modern political rationality, then Foucault s affirma- tive strategies of transgression are designed to upset this logic of humanism. According to Simons, Foucault s promotion of new modes of subjectivity seeks to answer the question, How can the growth of capabilities be discon- nected from the intensification of power relations? Although first developed in the 1960s in relation to art, Simons discusses how Foucault returns to the idea of transgression in his later writings. For Foucault, Simons clarifies, the act of transgression does not overcome limits, . . . but shows that what we are. . . depends on the existence of limits ; it is not the simple erasure but crit- ical illumination of limits, forcing it to find itself in what it excludes (p. 69). In discussion of Foucault s thoughts on transgressive practices, Simons concentrates first on art and ethics. Foucault not only associated modern art with the transgression of limits; through his intense study of ancient Greek and Hellenistic ethics, Foucault was capable of articulating a conception of ethics as an aesthetics of existence in which the individual strives to fashion the self as a work of art. Foucault s aesthetics of existence was designed to cultivate a nonuniversal relation of the individual to the self, which would begin to have an independent status, or at least a partial and relative auton- omy (p. 74). In this way, Foucault believed that the individual care of the self could disentangle the interlacement of ethics, truth, and power and thus . . . attain a greater degree of liberty (p. 78). According to Simons, Foucault also demarcates sites of transgression in politics. Although he believes power is ubiquitous, Foucault insists that there are no relations of power without resistances. States of domination, in which the action of individuals is so well determined in advance that there is nothing left to do, is a special case of power relations and by no means the rule. Despite these qualifications, Simons claims that in Foucault s writings, resistance is drastically undertheorized (p. 83). Here, however, Simons s 688 POLITICAL THEORY / October 2000 assertion seems as halfhearted as it is overstated. For his subsequent discus- sion of Foucault s conception of positive power relations as principally open to resistance as well as his thoughts on resistance belie the charge. Examples of the practices of resistance Foucault analyzes include not only philosophi- cal critique, a transgressive practice by which the individual can think other- wise, . . . to become other than what one is, but also the Greek practice of parrhesia or truth-telling as speaking frankly to powers that be despite its inherent dangers. Hence, it also comes as no surprise that Simons finds mani- fest in Foucault s positions on liberty as practice and agonistic openness elements of what he terms an ethic of permanent resistance (p. 87). Simons concludes his study with an evaluation of the impact Foucault s writings have had on contemporary political theory. After assessing the importance of Foucault for feminist theories of identity politics as well as comparing the political thought of Foucault and Habermas, Simons recog- nizes William Connolly s important contributions in developing the implica- tions of Foucault s thought for radical liberal democracy. Not only has he defended Foucault against critics such as Taylor, Connolly has discerned in Foucault s ethico-political sensibilities a new democratic ethos, an agonal form of radical liberal democracy. Committed as it is to the openness and temporality of its constitution, laws, policies, and identity, the agonistic pol- ity Connolly envisions carries forth the undefined work of freedom, of which Foucault spoke (p. 122). Not unlike Beardsworth s portrayal of Derrida s aporetic politics of lesser violence in a general economy of violence, Simons shows us how in an ines- capable web of power relations, Foucault s ethico-political project is com- mitted to games of power played with a minimum of domination. Perhaps the time has come to investigate the parallels between these two thinkers of the political who otherwise have often been perceived to be at cross purposes in their philosophical standpoints. David C. Durst American University in Bulgaria NOTES 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science (1817/1818), transcribed by Peter Wannenmann, edited by the Staff of the Hegel Archives, and translated by J. Micheal Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), �123. 2. I. Kant, Kant s Political Writings, edited with an introduction and notes by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 135. Durst / REVIEW ESSAY 689 3. Kant, Political Writings, 74-75. 4. Ibid., 45. 5. Hans Reiss, Postscript, in Kant, Political Writings, 267. 6. Ibid. 7. M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 16. 8. Ibid., 123. 9. Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 126. David C. Durst is an associate professor of philosophy at the American University in Bulgaria.

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