Jacques
I SOpinion
Rupnik*
S
June 2009
ThE challEngES Of EU EnlaRgEmEnT In
ThE BalkanS
During the wars that broke up the former Yugoslavia
1. The EU and other major international
and in their immediate aftermath, the European Union
actors
was often criticised for being inconsistent in its se-
curity policies and for the latent tension between the
emphasis on postwar regional cooperation (set out in
the Stability Pact) and the priority given to the merits US-led NATO enlargement in Central Europe pre-
of individual countries as the basis on which their EU ceded the enlargement of the EU and it seemed that
membership prospects were to be assessed (SAA this pattern was at work again in the Western Balkans
agreements). Today, the overall thrust of the EU s with the recent accession of Croatia and Albania to
Balkans policy has moved from an agenda dominated the Atlantic Alliance. The transatlantic bond and the
by security issues related to the wars that tore the emphasis on security appeared as a pre-condition to
region apart to an agenda focused on the Western a successful integration to the EU. In recent years the
Balkans EU accession prospects. A formal political international presence in the Balkans has become
commitment of all EU Member States to accession increasingly Europeanised, with US priorities hav-
has existed since the Thessaloniki summit of June ing shifted outside of Europe. The list of priorities is
2003. Kosovo s independence in February 2008 can long, encompassing the G2 with China, the reset
be seen as the turning point between the final stage of policy towards Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan
post-Yugoslav fragmentation and the region s engage- and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the Balkans
ment in the European integration process. A coherent at the bottom of the list something that is not always
EU approach to the region, it seemed, had been found greatly appreciated in the region. However, the US
at last: the framework was in place, the verbal com- has, since Vice-President Biden s visit to the region in
mitments of the political elites in the region were clear 2009, shown signs of continuing engagement which
enough, and the policy tools were supposedly familiar is also seen as crucial by several actors in the region
to all since the previous wave of Eastern enlarge- (Bosniaks, Kosovars, Albanians and Croats). There
ment. After all, what was the difference between en- are occasional transatlantic differences concerning
largement to Central Europe and enlargement to the assessments of the region s stability, particularly in re-
Balkans? Ten years. There are, however, a number lation to Bosnia (as voiced by Richard Holbrooke) and
of reasons why this optimistic assessment (as well as these have significant policy implications: should the
the coherence of EU enlargement policies) should be Office of the High Representative (OHR) be retained
questioned. or not? Is there a need for a US special envoy to the
* Jacques Rupnik, Director of Research at CERI-
Sciences Po, Paris and Visiting Fellow at the
European Union
College of Europe, Bruges, is also Associate
Union européenne
Researcher with the EUISS. He is a specialist in
Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
European Union Institute for Security Studies
1
2. coherence between regional and indi-
region? Although scaling down US engagement in the
Balkans is consistent with the process of European
vidual approaches to EU integration
integration, now seen as the only game in town , the
EU should encourage the US to maintain an involve- This brings to the fore the question of coherence be-
ment in the region especially as the US professes that tween regional and individual approaches to EU in-
its primary goal is precisely to assist in the region s tegration, highly topical since the debates about the
accession into the EU. We have moved from security- regional priorities of the Stability Pact for the Balkans
driven containment to politically-driven integration and the competition among individual countries en-
which can only be helped by a transatlantic insurance couraged by the SAA process. The current assumption
policy for the Balkans. is that the regatta approach works fine for the EU as
it makes the enlargement process discreet enough to
Russia played virtually no part in Central Europe s ac- meet with acceptance among Western public opinion
cession to the EU but it has in recent years acquired a and the political elites of the countries concerned. All
significant nuisance capacity in a number of countries of them support the swift accession of Croatia which
in the Balkans, most obviously in relation to energy they see as opening the door to the EU for the rest
supply and the Kosovo question. Serbia now tends to of the Western Balkans. The logic of emulation may
be considered in Brussels as pivotal to the region and work for some such as the former Yugoslav Republic
its current government as the most favorable to the of Macedonia (FYROM) or Montenegro, both of which
EU in two decades. Yet it has made a deal with Russia have already submitted their applications for EU mem-
on both the above-mentioned issues: giving Moscow a bership. But for unfinished states such as Bosnia,
stake in the energy sector while relying on its backing Kosovo and Serbia there may be a case for a paral-
in the UN over Kosovo. The consistency of the EU s re- lel track accession to the EU. The shared European
spective positions on Kosovo and the frozen conflicts roof was meant to help defuse and overcome conten-
in the Caucasus has, predictably, been questioned by tious territorial and institutional issues. To be sure, no
Russia. To say that these are self-serving arguments country s accession should in principle be held hos-
does not dispense with the need to address the ten- tage to the intransigence of its neighbour(s). But given
sion between the legitimacy of Kosovo s declaration the possible repercussions of different aspects of the
of independence and the difficult quest for its interna- Serbian question it also seems prudent to make sure
tional legal recognition. that unfinished statehood issues are settled simulta-
neously during the accession process when leverage
Turkey opened enlargement negotiations with the EU is strongest. This is a case for a regional approach
before the countries of the Western Balkans which, on a smaller scale, at least for a limited number of
from their perspective, was, for historical reasons, dif- countries.
ficult to understand. The question of the consistency
of the EU s future approach to enlargement could be All of this also helps to address concern regarding the
summed up as follows: is the EU aiming, given the ge- solution of unresolved conflicts during the EU accession
ographic proximity of the region, for a post-Ottoman process. There is no shortage of bilateral tensions and
enlargement to the South East? Or in the context of contentious issues in the region. Croatia, to take the ex-
the enlargement debate should the EU, for the sake of ample of the frontrunner for EU accession, has pending
political feasibility, keep the two issues of Turkey and border issues with all its neighbours. The one that ap-
the Balkans separate? There have been interesting peared easiest to solve, because it involved Slovenia,
and on the whole positive developments in the rela- recently became a very sensitive matter that risked
tions between the countries of the region (particularly blocking Croatia s EU accession (going all the way to
Greece, Bulgaria and most recently Serbia) that might a referendum which took place on 6 June, although
favour such an approach. However, the strong reluc- the result boosted Croatia s accession prospects). The
tance among public opinion with regard to the EU en- most difficult one obviously concerns relations between
largement to Turkey (particularly among the founding Serbia and Kosovo, as even the most pro-European
members of the EU) and Turkey s new assertiveness Serbian politicians keep repeating that recognition
as an international player suggest that, if the EU is is out of the question. Foreign minister Vuk Jeremic
serious about extending enlargement to the Western formulated Serbia s three no s: no to recognition of
Balkans, it might be best to dissociate their specific Kosovo, no to NATO accession and no to changing the
case from that of Turkey. status quo in Bosnia Herzegovina (i.e. not challenging
European Union Institute for Security Studies
2
Republika Srpska s Prime Minister Dodik s quest for a
4. from protectorates to integration
state-within-a-state). The third bilateral difficulty on the
through nation-state building
road to the EU concerns the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia s quest for a post-FYROM identity ac-
ceptable to its Greek neighbour. In the light of the above, the EU s two main successive
strategic approaches in the region can be summed
up as follows: (i) moving from crisis management to
Europeanised protectorates; (ii) overseeing the tran-
sition from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo from in-
3. coherence between EU policies
ternational protectorates to EU candidate states. The
difficulty (and this is where consistency is most imme-
The other question concerns the coherence between diately tested) is that the EU is for the first time in its
EU policies and those of its individual Member States. history directly involved in assisting in the creation of
Some of them have, for historical and geographic rea- its future Member States. There are three unfinished
sons, been more involved (Greece, Austria, Italy) from states in the Western Balkans: Bosnia, Kosovo and
the outset. Others, who are new members of the EU Serbia. EU Commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn
(Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania), have a direct stake in has rightly pointed out that protectorates cannot be in-
the region s stability and accession prospects. The tegrated in the EU. Nor can unfinished states. This is
proximity and involvement of an EU Member State is why two (hopefully) vanishing protectorates should be
usually considered to be a powerful vector of EU influ- examined as test cases.
ence in the region. But it can sometimes become an
impediment. Athens s unresolved conflict with Skopje Bosnia-Herzegovina: Is Bosnia a stable state? The
over the name of the Macedonian state has blocked answer depends on which High Representative you
the latter s joining NATO (which was supported by all listen to: former HR Paddy Ashdown fears disintegra-
other EU members). Croatia s difficulty or reluctance tion while, in the view of one his most recent succes-
in settling the border issue with Slovenia has led the sors, Miroslav Lajcak of Slovakia, the Bonn powers
latter to remind Zagreb that its consent is necessary have become irrelevant as well as the HR s office
to ratify Croatia s membership of NATO. Perhaps the itself. Is Bosnia a functional state? Clearly the an-
clearest warning for the EU in the region comes from swer has to be negative. Fifteen years after Dayton
the case of Cyprus: it was included to the Eastern it is a country with a constitution that segregates its
enlargement of 2004 at the insistence of Greece and ethnic communities to ensure peace but prevents the
the assumption in the EU was that accession to the emergence of an integrated polity. The country has no
Union would be conditional on ending the partition of Supreme Court, no independent judiciary, and oper-
the island in accordance with the UN plan. We know ates under three legal systems and four penal codes.
what happened to that assumption and this is now The European Court of Human Rights has recently
considered in the EU as a major lesson for the future condemned BiH for preventing one of its citizens from
in dealing with the Western Balkans. running for president on grounds of ethnicity (the Finci
case). In short: the country needs to move from the
These developments should suffice to qualify the wide- Dayton constitution to a Brussels-oriented constitu-
spread assumption that a Member State is the best tion. No amount of external pressure by European and
advocate of its neighbour as a prospective candidate American (Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg
member and the best force for stabilisation. The inclu- has visited Sarajevo five times in the past year) has so
sion of Croatia in the EU would certainly contribute far, as the Butmir process in October 2009 showed,
to the stabilisation of democracy there. However, the been able to achieve substantial progress on this key
impact on neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) re- issue for the future viability of the state.
mains debatable as Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the majority of whom own Croatian passports, are The protectorate ensured stability but reinforced dys-
losing interest in the future of their state (there are functionality. Can the transition from the protectorate
more voters registered in Croatia than there are ac- and a shift to a pre-accession agenda generate a pow-
tual citizens). Romania is the most vocal advocate of erful enough leverage to push through the institutional
Moldova s future membership in the EU. Its influence reform that is vital to develop a sense of ownership and
over its Eastern neighbour has, during the 2009 politi- make BiH a viable polity? This is where one man s plea
cal crisis in Chisinau, been alternately depicted in terms for the credibility of the European leverage borders on
of attraction and destabilisation by opposing sides in another man s act of faith. The one major positive de-
the political struggle. In short, a coherent enlargement velopment to report is that Belgrade and Zagreb have,
policy should also entail a careful consideration of its for reasons associated with their European accession
impact on neighbours and thus its relationship to the prospects, abandoned the divisive policies of the past.
EU s neighbourhood policy or its Eastern Partnership . This in turn could help the process of reconciliation
European Union Institute for Security Studies
3
without which the trust necessary for overcoming the a Gallup Balkan Monitor poll from November 2009 the
prevailing logic of ethnic exclusion cannot be built. majority of citizens in each of the candidate countries
for joining the EU believe their country is heading in
Kosovo s independence, proclaimed in February the wrong direction . Hence the importance of check-
2008, has gradually led to a scaling down of UNMIK ing such premature doubts about a process which has
and launched EULEX as the largest civilian mission hardly started. This points to the limited usefulness of
ever launched under CSDP. The challenge is to as- a summit to commemorate a summit (Sarajevo 2010
sist in Kosovo s transition from protectorate status and celebrates Zagreb 2000) and to the need for tangible
build up a new state in a process where the EU pres- measures that would facilitate citizens directly identi-
ence would be transformed into a pre-accession moni- fication with Europe. Visa liberalization has obviously
toring role. The rationale sounds coherent enough on been the most important both symbolically and politi-
the surface; however it must be remembered that: cally. But it is equally important to recognise that EU
accession does not concern just governments and
The EU still coexists with UNMIK and the International institutions and must involve societies concerned.
Civilian Office (ICO). EULEX is supposed to as- Money spent by the EU on assistance to civil soci-
sist the rule of law in the new state, but it officially ety actors is the best investment in the success of the
remains status-neutral given that five EU Member process.
States have not recognised Kosovo independence.
Meanwhile it remains unclear what legislation applies The agenda for both the countries of the Western
when in Kosovo: is it the international regulations Balkans and for the EU seems clear enough. For the
adopted in the past decade under UNMIK? Is it the former the priority must be to respond to the doubts
new laws voted by the democratically elected Kosovo raised about the rule of law after the accession of
parliament? Or is it (in the Northern enclave around Romania and Bulgaria by tackling the question of cor-
Mitrovica) Serbian/ex-Yugoslav law? Depending on ruption and clientelism and by addressing its main
where you are and when you get different answers to sources: the legacies of the war economy (getting
this question. And this, in turn leads to other related around international trade embargoes through the
questions: which state, which international agency, black market and the development of a shadow econ-
which law? This surely is the most formidable consist- omy), the privatisation process and the use of public
ency challenge for EU representative Peter Feith and sector employment for patronage and state capture.
more generally for the EU mission in Kosovo. Hence These countries must show that nationalisms can be
also the question: is Kosovo really an independent made eurocompatible along the Croatian model with
state on the road to the EU or does the presence of a binding commitment to resolve the aforementioned
the EULEX mission simply mark a new phase in its border disputes which could become a serious im-
existence as a protectorate? Will Kosovo be able to pediment to EU accession. The lesson from Cyprus is:
establish a new relationship with its Serbian minority there will be no EU enlargement unless the bilateral
and with Serbia on their parallel tracks into the EU? Or conflicts are resolved first.
is partition, Belgrade s hidden agenda, an acceptable
one for the EU exit strategy? For the EU, the Balkans requires it to a rethink its con-
cept of enlargement which cannot , for the reasons out-
lined above, be simply a replica of the pattern success-
w w w
fully implemented in Central Europe. The EU should
strengthen the regional approach by granting candidate
These are some of the main dilemmas raised in ex- status to all countries of the region and setting a date
amining the coherence of the EU s approaches to the to open negotiations. The pace and completion of the
Western Balkans. There is a stark contrast between process will then depend on the capacity to deliver of
stated goals and their actual implementation. No won- the political elites of each country, thus making their
der Europeanisation looks different when seen from respective responsibilities clear and the political risks
Brussels and from the countries at the receiving end. and costs of failure more acceptable. Such a tangible
This is also where enlargement fatigue within the EU and assertive European commitment to the Balkans,
meets accession fatigue in the Balkans. The latter which is not challenged within the EU, is all the more
has two aspects: the political elites in the region some- important as it remains, for the foreseeable future, the
times using verbal commitments to EU accession as only convincing scenario for EU enlargement. It would
a smokescreen for business as usual. Equally, there also be the best way for the EU to downplay its divi-
is the erosion of popular support for EU accession sions (over Kosovo), overcome its hesitations between
(strongest where it is least advanced, in Albania; weak- containment and integration, and restore its credibility
est where it is most advanced, in Croatia) According to in the region and as an international actor.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the EUISS
European Union Institute for Security Studies
4
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